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ASSESSING THE EFFECT OF FIREARMS
REGULATIONS USING PARTIAL
IDENTIFICATION METHODS: A CASE
STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF STAND
YOUR GROUND LAWS ON VIOLENT
CRIME*
MEGAN MILLER** & JOHN PEPPER***
I
INTRODUCTION
Empirical research has struggled to reach consensus about the impact of
firearms regulations on crime.1 Consider, for example, the recent research on
Stand Your Ground (SYG) laws that allow a person to use lethal force in selfdefense in places outside of the home without first attempting to retreat. Using
repeated cross-sectional data on annual state crime rates, recent studies have
examined the impact of these laws on murder and other violent crimes.2
Unfortunately, this research has been inconclusive, with some studies finding
positive effects, others reporting negligible or insignificant effects, and still others
concluding that SYG laws decrease violent crime.3 Lott, for example, concludes
SYG laws reduce murder rates by nine percent and overall violent crime by
eleven percent, while Cheng and Hoekstra find that these laws increase the
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1. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL REVIEW 12551 (Charles F. Wellford et al. eds., 2005); Charles F. Manski & John V. Pepper, How Do Right-to-Carry
Laws Affect Crime Rates? Coping With Ambiguity Using Bounded-Variation Assumptions, 100 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 232–44 (2018) [hereinafter Manski & Pepper, Right-to-Carry Laws].
2. See generally, e.g., JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME
AND GUN-CONTROL LAWS (3d ed. 2010); Cheng & Mark Hoekstra, Does Strengthening Self-Defense
Law Deter Crime or Escalate Violence? Evidence from Expansions to Castle Doctrine, 48 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 821 (2013); Chandler B. McClellan & Erdal Tekin, Stand Your Ground Laws, Homicides,
and Injuries, 52 J. HUM. RESOURCES 621 (2017).
3. Theory provides little guidance. These laws might deter some crimes if potential offenders
perceive the costs of committing crimes may be higher. Yet, these laws may increase the lethality of
criminal encounters.
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murder rate by eight percent.4 As in many other areas of research on the impact
of gun regulations, empirical results on SYG laws are highly variable and
sensitive to minor variations in the data or the model.
The fundamental difficulty in drawing inferences on the effects of gun
regulations is that the outcomes of counterfactual policies are unobservable.
Data alone cannot reveal what the murder rate in a state with a SYG law would
have been had the state not adopted the statute. To address this selection
problem, observed crime data must be combined with assumptions to enable
inferences on counterfactual outcomes. Yet, the assumptions needed to identify
these counterfactual outcomes cannot be tested empirically, and different
assumptions can yield different inferences.
In this setting, where the data alone cannot reveal the effect of firearms
regulations on violent crime, it is tempting to impose assumptions strong enough
to yield a definitive finding.5 When this happens, the effect of a firearms
regulation is said to be point-identified. Researchers often recognize that these
strong assumptions may have little foundation, but defend their strong
assumptions as necessary to “provide answers.” However, strong assumptions
may be inaccurate, yielding flawed and conflicting conclusions. We have seen this
repeatedly in the empirical literature on the firearms regulations in general and
SYG laws in particular.
To focus attention on the sensitivity of inferences to the underlying
identifying assumptions, we make two simplifying restrictions here. First, we
examine only the effects of adopting SYG laws in a single year rather than at
any point in time. In particular, to simplify the analysis, we draw inferences on
the effect of SYG laws on average violent crime rates from 2008–2010 for the
thirteen states that adopted these statutes in 2006. By focusing on the impact of
adopting a SYG law in 2006, we do not need to make assumptions about how
the effect of the statute varies with time.6 Second, we do not provide measures
of statistical precision (for example, standard errors or confidence intervals).7
Instead, we view the states as the population of interest, rather than as
realizations from some sampling process. Thus, imprecision expressed through
the width of the bounds only reflects the selection problem, not sampling
variability. We do this to focus attention on the selection problem discussed
above. However, even if we wanted to provide measures reflecting the

4. See LOTT, supra note 2, at 333; Cheng & Hoekstra, supra note 2, at 849; see also McClellan &
Tekin, supra note 2, at 849 (“[R]esults indicate that Castle Doctrine Laws increase total homicides by
around 8 percent.”).
5. See Manski & Pepper, Right-to-Carry Laws, supra note 1; Charles F. Manski & John V. Pepper,
Deterrence and the Death Penalty: Partial Identification Analysis Using Repeated Cross Sections, 29 J.
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY, 29(1), 123-141, (2013) [hereinafter Manski & Pepper, Deterrence].
6. The effects of right-to-carry laws on crime, for example, have been found to vary over time.
See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1; see also John J. Donohue, Abhay Aneja & Kyle
D. Weber, Right‐to‐Carry Laws and Violent Crime: A Comprehensive Assessment Using Panel Data and
a State‐Level Synthetic Control Analysis, 16 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 198 (2019).
7. See Manski & Pepper, Right-to-Carry Laws, supra note 1, at 234–35.
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uncertainty generated by sampling variability, it is not clear how to do so in this
setting, where the state crime rate is the outcome variable of interest. The
conventional assumption of random sampling from an infinite population is not
natural when considering states as units of observation, and it is not clear what
type of sampling process would be reasonable to assume.8,9
With this in mind, we seek to make transparent how assumptions shape
inferences on the effects of firearms regulations on violent crime. As noted
above, the existing empirical literature provides no clear insight on whether
SYG laws increase or decrease violent crime, which can in part be attributed to
the varying assumptions made in the literature. This Article highlights the
inherent tradeoff between the strength and credibility of assumptions and
findings. To do this, we apply the partial identification approach developed by
Manski and Pepper to re-examine the empirical analysis of the average effect of
SYG laws on violent crime.10 These weaker, more credible models bound the
average effect of SYG laws on violent crime, where the width of estimated
bounds reflects the uncertainly resulting from the selection problem.
We begin in Part II by demonstrating the sensitivity of inferences to the
traditional models which have been used to point-identify the average treatment
effect (ATE). As described above, the traditional approach for resolving the
selection problem is to impose assumptions strong enough to yield a definitive
finding (that is, a point-identified average effect). However, these strong
assumptions may be inaccurate, yielding flawed and conflicting conclusions; and
we have seen this problem repeatedly in the empirical literature on gun
regulations. In the analyses of SYG laws in particular, the traditional
assumptions asserting that expected counterfactual outcomes are invariant across
geography or time lead to qualitatively different empirical findings.
In light of these conflicting findings, what credible conclusions about the
effect of SYG statutes can be drawn from the empirical literature? At one
extreme, some might take the variability as evidence that empirical results are
uninformative. At another, some might argue in favor of a particular model, and
draw conclusions based on that model. Yet, the model assumptions cannot

8. See id.; see also Alberto Abadie et al., Finite Population Casual Standard Errors (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20325, 2014). In the setting of a randomized experimental design,
Abadie and co-authors develop an alternative conceptualization for drawing inferences when one
observes the entire population. However, their modified approach is not applicable in the more general
observational data settings where the treatment—for example, right-to-carry laws—may be endogenous.
9. In the panel data literature using annual state or county crime rates to infer the impact of
firearms regulations on crime, some researchers report standard errors that allow for arbitrary
correlation within at a state or county—so called state/county clustered standard errors—while others do
not allow for such correlations. The publications by NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, and
Alberto Abadie et al., supra note 8, show that these clustered sampling standard errors are generally
inappropriate in the standard linear panel data models (with fixed state and/or county effects) used in
the literature. Manski & Pepper, Right-to-Carry Laws, supra note 1, argue that random sampling
assumptions underlying these conventional approaches may not be justified.
10. See generally Manski & Pepper, Right-to-Carry Laws, supra note 1.
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generally be tested empirically and often have little foundation.11 If the
assumptions lack credibility and consensus, picking a “winner” does not resolve
the ambiguity.
In Part III, we apply an alternative middle ground approach for drawing
inferences under the weaker bounded variation assumptions developed in
Manski and Pepper.12 The basic idea is to replace the assumptions of invariance
across geography or time with weaker bounded variation assumptions. For
example, rather than assuming that states with and without SYG statutes would
otherwise have identical crime rates, we might instead assume these two groups
of states are similar to one another. Likewise, one might consider the assumption
that, in the absence of a SYG statute, these two groups of states would have
experienced similar but not identical trends in crime rates.
Bounded variation assumptions provide a way to relax the traditional
invariance assumptions and improve the credibility of the empirical research on
the impact of gun regulations. Manski and Pepper13 show that these assumptions
partially identify the ATE, yielding bounds rather than point estimates.14 The
basic insight is empirical results need not be an all or nothing undertaking.
Available data and credible assumptions may lead to partial conclusions.
In Part IV, we draw conclusions. Under very weak assumptions, the data
cannot reveal whether SYG laws increase or decrease crime. However, under our
preferred set of bounded variation assumptions, we draw substantive conclusions
about the qualitative and quantitative impact of SYG laws on violent crime. In
particular, we find SYG laws have modest positive effects on rates of violent
crime and murder, and uncertain effects on robbery and assault.
II
INFERENCES UNDER POINT-IDENTIFIED MODELS
In this Part, we demonstrate the sensitivity of inferences on the effect of SYG
laws on violent crime, focusing on the types of point-identified models used in
the literature. After providing a brief description of the data in Part II.A, in Part

11. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1.
12. See generally Manski & Pepper, Right-to-Carry Laws, supra note 1.
13. See generally id.
14. Partial identification analysis of treatment effects from observational data was initiated in
Charles F. Manski, Nonparametric Bounds on Treatment Effects, 80 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC.
319 (1990). For textbook exposition, see generally CHARLES F. MANSKI, PARTIAL IDENTIFICATION OF
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS (2003), and CHARLES F. MANSKI, IDENTIFICATION FOR PREDICTION
AND DECISION (2007). For applications, see generally, for example, Brent Kreider et al., Identifying the
Effects of SNAP (Food Stamps) on Child Health Outcomes When Participation is Endogenous and
Misreported, 107 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 958 (2012); Charles F. Manski & Daniel S. Nagin, Bounding
Disagreements About Treatment Effects: A Case Study of Sentencing and Recidivism, 28 SOC.
METHODOLOGY 99 (1998); Charles F. Manski & John V. Pepper, Monotone Instrumental Variables: With
an Application to the Returns to Schooling, 68 ECONOMETRICA 997 (2000); John V. Pepper, The
Intergenerational Transmission of Welfare Receipt: A Nonparametric Bounds Analysis, 82 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 472 (2000). See also Manski & Pepper, Deterrence, supra note 5.

BOOK PROOF - MILLER PEPPER (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 3 2020]

ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF FIREARMS REGULATIONS

8/5/2020 4:23 PM

217

II.B we examine the unconditional crime rates, and in Part II.C we estimate the
types of linear regression models applied in the literature.15
We consider the problem of drawing inferences on the effect of SYG laws on
average violent crime rates in the 2008–2010 period for the thirteen states that
adopted these statutes in 2006.16 The data reveal the annual crime rates from
2008–2010 in the thirteen states that adopted SYG statutes in 2006, but do not
reveal the counterfactual crime rate that would have occurred had the thirteen
treated states not adopted SYG laws. To address the selection problem, we
consider three different invariance assumptions that point-identify the
counterfactual crime rate as equal to either: (i) the average crime rate in the
thirteen treated states before 2006 (in 2000–2004); (ii) the average crime rate in
untreated states in the contemporary post-2006 period (in 2008–2010); or (iii) the
pre-treatment rate in treated states adjusted by the trend in crime rates in the
untreated states, as would be the case in a difference-in-difference model.
We conclude this Part by examining the pre-2006 data when the thirteen
treated states did not have SYG statutes. Although the identifying assumptions
cannot be empirically tested in the post-2006 period when the crime rates that
would have occurred without SYG laws are counterfactual, they can be assessed
in the pre-2006 period. For example, one identifying assumption holds that the
effect of a SYG law can be identified as the difference between the crime rate in
treated states post-2006 and untreated states post-2006. If this invariance model
is valid in the pre-2006 period, the average homicide rate in states that adopt SYG
laws should equal the average rate in states that do not adopt. After all, before
2006, none of the states used in our analysis had adopted a SYG statute. Yet, the
homicide rate in states that adopt SYG laws in 2006 exceeds the rate in nonadopting states by as much as one and a half-points in the pre-2006 period.17 Thus,
this contemporaneous invariance model is rejected in the pre-2006 period. In fact,
all three invariance model assumptions are violated during this period.
A. Data
The crime data used in our analysis comes from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reports.18 We use state-level data on annual
crime rates (per 100,000 residents) from 1977 to 2010. For each state and year,
we observe the overall violent crime rate and crime rates separately for murder,

15. See sources cited supra note 2.
16. The thirteen states are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and South Dakota.
17. See infra Table 5.
18. These panel data were originally assembled by John Lott and have subsequently been modified,
corrected, and updated several times. Our analysis uses the iteration assembled and evaluated by Abhay
Aneja, John J. Donohue & Alexandria Zhang, The Impact of Right-to-Carry Laws and the NRC Report:
Lessons for the Empirical Evaluation of Law and Policy, 13 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 565 (2011).
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assault, and robbery. We also observe whether a SYG statute is in place.19 Our
analysis uses the SYG adoption date data from Cheng and Hoekstra.20
To illustrate the basic counterfactual outcomes problem, we focus on the
impact of SYG laws in the thirteen states that adopted them in 2006. We refer to
the states adopting SYG statutes in 2006 as “treated” states, and those that did
not adopt them as “untreated” states. The eight other states that adopted SYG
laws between 2005 and 2009 are excluded from the analysis.21
Figures 1A and 1B display the annual time series of murder and robbery rates
in treated and untreated states from 1990 to 2010. The figures reveal several
interesting characteristics of the crime rates.
First, murder rates in the treated states exceed the analogous rates in the
untreated states. The opposite pattern exists for robbery. Second, the annual time
series variation from 1990 to 2010 in crime rates for the two groups of states is
similar, but not identical. For example, crime rates in untreated states have a
more pronounced drop during the 1990s than those in treated states.
Figure 1A. Murder Rate by Year and Treatment Status
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19. There are significant differences in the definition of a SYG law within the literature. In
particular, LOTT, supra note 2, studies primarily “Castle Doctrine” laws, which remove the “duty to
retreat” from the home before using lethal force. Once these laws are passed, people are allowed to use
force to defend their homes even if they could retreat from the home to safety. More recent papers
consider a SYG law to be a law that removes the duty to retreat from somewhere outside of the home.
McClellan & Tekin, supra note 2, consider any law that removes the duty to retreat from a public space,
while Cheng & Hoekstra, supra note 2, consider laws that remove the duty to retreat from someplace
outside of the home, which might include private property such as a vehicle. We use the classification
reported in Cheng & Hoekstra, supra note 2. Thus, the laws passed in thirteen states in 2006 that
expanded the “Castle Doctrine” to someplace outside of the home constitute SYG laws for our purposes
in this Article.
20. See generally Cheng & Hoekstra, supra note 2.
21. These states are Florida (2005), Missouri (2007), Montana (2009), North Dakota (2007), Ohio
(2008), Tennessee (2007), Texas (2007), and West Virginia (2008).

BOOK PROOF - MILLER PEPPER (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 3 2020]

8/5/2020 4:23 PM

ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF FIREARMS REGULATIONS

219

Figure 1B. Robbery Rate by Year and Treatment Status
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B. Unconditional Analysis
Consider the problem of using these data to draw inferences on the impact of
adoption of a SYG law on the average murder rate in the 2008–2010 period for
the thirteen states that adopted these statutes in 2006. Table 1 displays the
average murder rate per 100,000 residents from 2000–2004 and from 2008–2010
in the states that did and did not adopt SYG statutes in 2006.
Table 1. Average Murder Rates per 100,000 Residents by Period and Treatment
Status22
Treated (in 2006)
Untreated

2000–2004
6.94
5.16

2008–2010
6.17
4.52

What do these data reveal about the effect of SYG laws on the 2008–2010
murder rate in treated states? The average murder rate in the 2008–2010 period
in the thirteen states that adopted SYG statute in 2006 equals 6.17. However, the
data do not reveal the murder rate that would have been observed in the treated
states had the statutes not been adopted in 2006, which is necessary to assess the
impacts of these statutes on the murder rate.
These counterfactual average murder rates can be estimated by comparing
the 6.17 value to other rates presented in Table 1. Each comparison represents a
different assumption and results in a different estimated ATE. Thus, our
assumptions provide three different estimates of the counterfactual average
murder rate:
i.
A before-after assumption uses the pre-period rates (2000–2004)
among the treated states, 6.94, as the point of comparison;
22. The treated group includes the thirteen states stated supra note 16. The untreated group includes
twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia. The eight states that adopted the SYG statutes between
2005 and 2009 (not including 2006), stated supra note 21, are not included.
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ii.

A contemporaneous assumption uses the contemporaneous rate in
the untreated states, 4.52, as the point of comparison; and
iii.
A difference-in-difference assumption (DnD) adjusts the pre-period
rate in the treated states by the time-series variation in the untreated
state, 6.29 (=6.94-(5.16-4.52)).
These data and assumptions result in estimated ATEs of -0.77, 1.66, and -0.12,
respectively, and are summarized in Table 2. Table 3 displays estimates of the
ATE of SYG laws on violent crime, murder, robbery, and assault under the same
modeling assumptions. All of the estimates in Tables 2 and 3 are highly sensitive
to the different modeling assumptions: depending on the model used, the
estimates imply that SYG laws decrease, increase, or have almost no effect on
murder rates, and have similarly variable impacts on other crime rates.
Given certain assumptions, each estimate measures the effect of SYG laws
on the murder or other crime rates. The before-after estimate is correct under
the assumption that, except for the enactment of a SYG law, no determinant of
criminal behavior changed in treated states between the early and late 2000s. The
contemporaneous comparison estimate of the 2008–2010 rates is correct under
the assumption that, except for the presence of the SYG statutes in the treated
states, the populations of the treated and untreated states had the same
propensities for criminal behavior and faced the same environments. The DnD
estimate is correct under the assumption that, in the absence of a SYG statute,
the treated and untreated states would have experienced the same change in
murder and crime rates between the early and late 2000s. Thus, each of the three
estimates can be justified by specific invariance assumptions. However, it may be
that none of the assumptions hold and the variation in empirical findings shows
that these invariance assumptions cannot jointly hold.
Table 2. 2008–2010 Murder Rate for the Treated States Under Different Models:
Observed, Counterfactual, and the ATE
Model Employed
Before-After
Contemporaneous
DnD

Observed
Murder Rate
6.17
6.17
6.17

Counterfactual Murder
Rate
6.94
4.52
6.30

ATE
-0.77
1.65
-0.12

Table 3. Crime Rate ATEs Under Different Invariance Models
Model Employed
Before-After
Contemporaneous
DnD

Murder
-0.8
1.7
-0.1

Robbery
-4
-14
9

Assault
-27
56
18

Violent Crime
-35
53
27

Importantly, these are more than contrived illustrations of the sensitivity of
inferences to different assumptions. All three of these research designs have been
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applied in the literature on the impact of SYG statutes, especially the beforeafter and DnD models.23
While commonly used, these invariance assumptions may not credibly
address the selection problem. SYG statutes are not likely to be randomly
assigned, as would be the case in a randomized control trial, and any imaginable
comparison group is likely to differ in ways that may lead to spurious correlations
in the observed data and biased inferences on the impact of firearms regulations.
To address this concern, many of these studies (especially those using DnD
models) use multiple regression models to statistically account for observed
factors such as state demographics, socioeconomics, policing, other firearms laws,
and so forth. In this case, researchers employ the conditional analysis approach,
which assumes that an invariance assumption conditionally applies when
statistically controlling for the set of observed covariates even if it may not apply
when excluding such control variables from the analysis. Yet, the fact that states
or time-periods with the same observed covariates have different firearms
regulations suggests that confounding unobserved factors may play a role in the
selection process even after controlling for observed variables. We consider the
conditional analysis approach below in Part II.C.
C. Conditional Analysis
Some evaluations of SYG laws analyze crime data across many states and
years and statistically control for a large set of observed covariates.24 Although
these studies use additional data on SYG statutes, annual crime rates, and
covariates, the empirical findings rest on similar if not stronger identifying
assumptions. Data alone cannot resolve the selection problem.
Consider, for example, the linear panel data models that rely on the strong
invariance assumption that, after controlling for a set of covariates, SYG laws
have the same effect on crime rates in all states and years. When combined with
certain other assumptions, this homogeneity assumption point-identified the
impact of SYG laws on crime. However, the assumption that the effects of
firearms regulations are identical across states and time is not credible. For

23. The before-after invariance model is applied in Mitchell B. Chamlin, An Assessment of the
Intended and Unintended Consequences of Arizona’s Self-Defense, Home Protection Act, 37 J. CRIME &
JUST. 327 (2014); Mitchell B. Chamlin & Andrea E. Krajewski, Use of Force and Home Safety: An Impact
Assessment of Oklahoma’s Stand Your Ground Law, 37 DEVIANT BEHAV. 237 (2015); David K.
Humphreys, Evaluating the Impact of Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” Self-Defense Law on Homicide
and Suicide by Firearm: An Interrupted Time Series Study, 177 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 44 (2017); Ling
Ren et al., The Deterrent Effect of the Castle Doctrine Law on Burglary in Texas: A Tale of Outcomes in
Houston and Dallas, 61 CRIME & DELINQ. 1127 (2015).
DnD invariance models are also applied in a number of papers. See generally sources cited supra
note 2; see also generally Vincent Ferraro & Saran Ghatak, Expanding the Castle: Explaining Stand Your
Ground Legislation in American States, 2005–2012, 62 SOC. PERSP. 907 (2019); Mark Guis, The
Relationship Between Stand-Your-Ground Laws and Crime: A State-level Analysis, 53 SOC. SCI. J. 329
(2016); Daniel Webster et al., Effects of the Repeal of Missouri’s Handgun Purchaser Licensing Law on
Homicides, 91 J. URB. HEALTH 293 (2014).
24. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 2.
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example, the empirical literature on right-to-carry (RTC) laws finds that the
effects of these laws vary over time and across states.25
To illustrate how estimates from the linear panel data models can vary with
data and assumptions, we use repeated cross-sectional crime data from 1977–
2010 to estimate a set of linear panel data models that differ in the underlying
invariance restrictions, the time period used in the evaluation, the set of
covariates, and the classification of SYG statutes. For each model, we present
estimates for the log crime rate and the level crime rate. Much of the literature
studies the natural log of the crime rate, where the estimates are interpreted as
the effect of a SYG law on the percent change in the average crime rate.
Following Manski and Pepper, our analysis here using the bounded variation
assumption focuses directly on the state-year crime rates in which case the
estimates are interpreted as the effect of SYG law on the average crime rate.26
We also present results using two different sets of covariates applied in the
literature on RTC laws. First, we use the control variables from Lott including
detailed state race and age demographics, the arrest rate, the incarceration rate,
median per-capita income, the poverty and unemployment rate, an RTC
indicator, and state and year fixed effects.27 Second, we use the more
parsimonious set of controls from Donohue and co-authors.28 In particular, this
specification does not include measures of the arrest rate or the full set of age and
race demographic control variables, but does include variables measuring the size
of the police force.
As with the unconditional analysis in Part II.B, the estimates from these linear
panel data models vary with the particular form of the invariance assumption.
Table 4A presents results restricting the treatment group to the same thirteen
“treated” states that adopted SYG statutes in 2006 and the control group to the
same “untreated” states that did not adopt a SYG statute used in Parts II.A and
B.29 Most of the point estimates imply that SYG laws increase violent crime, but
the estimated magnitudes are sensitive to the underlying identifying assumption.
The first two rows in Table 4A present basic linear DnD results with different
sets of covariates. The estimates displayed in Row 1, which use the Lott
specifications,30 suggest that SYG laws increased the average murder rate by 9%,
the robbery rate by 2%, and overall violent crime rate by 1%, but decreased the
average assault rate by 1%. The second row, which reports results using the
specifications from Donahue and co-authors,31 suggests substantially larger
effects of SYG laws; SYG laws increased murder rates by 12%, and increased
robbery, assault, and violent crime rates by about 5%.
25. See generally, e.g., Donohue, Aneja & Weber, supra note 6.
26. See generally Manski & Pepper, Right-to-Carry Laws, supra note 1.
27. See generally LOTT, supra note 2.
28. See generally Donohue, Aneja & Weber, supra note 6. This is similar to the set of controls used
in Cheng & Hoekstra, supra note 2.
29. The eight states that adopted SYG laws in other years, identified supra note 21, are dropped.
30. See generally LOTT, supra note 2.
31. See generally Donohue, Aneja & Weber, supra note 6.
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Table 4A. Linear Panel Model Estimates, 13 Treated States that Adopted in 2006
Murder
Log
Level

Robbery
Log
Level

Log

Assault
Level

Violent crime
Log
Level

DnD, Lott (2010)
controls

0.09

0.75

0.02

8.31

-0.01

3.68

0.01

12.13

DnD, Donohue
(2019) controls

0.12

0.39

0.05

17.15

0.03

-4.11

0.05

13.42

Before/After, Lott
controls

0.12

0.79

0.09

11.04

-0.01

-3.45

0.03

11.85

Contemporaneous,
Lott controls

0.06

0.32

0.21

9.39

0.17

48.13

0.15

60.91

The final two rows in Table 4A present estimates for a before-after and
contemporaneous identification strategy for the effect of SYG laws on crime
rates. The before-after comparison uses only states that passed the law in 2006
and compares the crime rates in those states before and after 2006, while the
contemporaneous estimate compares crime rates after 2006 in states that passed
a SYG law with the crime rates in states that did not. While these estimates
generally imply SYG laws increase violent crime, the magnitudes vary across the
two models. For example, SYG laws are estimated to increase the robbery rate
by 21% under the contemporaneous invariance model versus a 9% increase
under the before-after model.
Overall, these results suggest that SYG laws increase violent crime rates for
the thirteen treated states in the 2008–2010 period. However, there is substantial
variation in the magnitude of the estimated effects. Depending on the identifying
assumptions, the log crime rate regression estimates imply that SYG laws
increase murder rates between 6% and 12%, robbery between 2% and 21%, the
assault rate between -1% and 17%, and the violent crime rate between 1% and
15%.
Table 4B expands the treatment group to all states that adopted SYG statutes
between 2005 and 2010.32 This replicates the basic models and time period
examined by Cheng and Hoekstra.33 As in Cheng and Hoekstra’s article, the
resulting estimates imply that SYG laws increase some crimes but decrease
others. In particular, when using the covariates employed by Donahue and coauthors,34 SYG laws are estimated to increase the murder rates by 4% but
decrease the robbery and assault rates by 6% and 2%, respectively.
Finally, Table 4C uses data from 1977–2005 to examine the effect of the
“Castle Doctrine” laws, which remove the “duty to retreat” from the home

32. These additional states are identified supra note 21.
33. See generally Cheng & Hoekstra, supra note 2.
34. See generally Donohue, Aneja & Weber, supra note 6.
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before using lethal force.35 As with Lott’s findings, the resulting estimates imply
that these laws decrease violent crime. In particular, the murder rate is estimated
to fall by 4%, robbery by 2%, and assault by 10%. Finally, under this
specification, SYG laws are estimated to decrease the overall violent crime rate
by 6%.
Table 4B. Linear Panel Data Model Estimates 2005–2010, Cheng and Hoekstra
(2013) Replication36
Murder

DnD, Lott
(2010)
controls
DnD,
Donohue
(2019)
controls

Robbery

Assault

Violent crime

Log

Level

Log

Level

Log

Level

Log

Level

0.03

0.13

-0.0001

-2.67

-0.005

-16.06

-0.003

-19.40

0.04

0.10

-0.06

-13.59

-0.02

-34.40

-0.03

-48.01

Table 4C. Linear Panel Data Model Estimates 1977–2005, Lott (2010) Replication37
Log
DnD, Lott
(2010)
controls

-0.04

Murder
Level
-0.49

Robbery
Log
Level

Log

-0.02

-0.10

5.27

Assault
Level
-44.37

Violent crime
Log
Level
-0.06

-40.32

D. Assessing the Invariance Assumptions Using Pre-Treatment Data
One question to consider in light of the different invariance models’ estimates
is whether a data-driven approach can determine if any of the identifying
assumptions are valid. Although the validity of the different invariance models
cannot be empirically tested, pre-treatment data can be used to assess the
credibility of the assumptions. Here, we can compare the pre-treatment estimates
of the crime rate implied by the invariance model with the observed crime rate
in the thirteen states that adopt SYG laws in 2006. The invariance model, if
correct, point-identifies the crime rate that would be realized if the treated states
did not have a SYG statute. Pre-2006, the treated states did not have a SYG
statute. Thus, if the invariance assumptions are valid in the pre-2006 period, the
estimated rate of crime found under the invariance assumption will equal the
observed crime rate in the thirteen treated states. If so, this finding may provide
some heuristic support in favor of the invariance assumption.
The crime rates displayed in Figures 1A and 1B provide direct evidence that
the invariance assumptions do not hold across all years. All three of the
invariance model assumptions are inconsistent with crime rate data pre-2006,
35. These are the object of Lott’s analysis. See generally LOTT, supra note 2. The treated states for
this analysis include Florida (2005), Illinois (2004), Colorado (1995), New Mexico (1978), North Carolina
(1993), Utah (2003), and Washington (1999).
36. See generally Cheng & Hoekstra, supra note 2.
37. See generally LOTT, supra note 2.
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before any state in our data set adopted a SYG statute. For example, consider
the annual murder rates in treated and untreated states displayed in Figure 1A.
While these states did not have SYG statutes prior to 2006, the murder rates vary
over time and across the groups of states from 1990 to 2006. For example, in 2000,
the average murder rate in the thirteen treated states is 1.2 points higher than the
average rate in untreated states, nearly four points less than the average murder
rate in treated states in 1990, and 0.03 points less than the rate found using the
DnD invariance model. Thus, the strict invariance assumptions are violated in
2000, before these states adopted SYG statutes. Moreover, the signs and
magnitudes of these violations differ over time and across models.
Table 5 provides additional evidence on these violations. For each pair of
adjacent years from 1990 to 2006, we compute the differences between the
observed crime rate in the treated states and the analogous rate found under
three different invariance models. In Table 5, we display the maximum of the
absolute values of these differences. So, for example, the before-after assumption
is inconsistent with the observed crime rate in treated states by as much as eightyfive crimes per 100,000 people for violent crime, one for murder, fifteen for
robbery and sixty for assault. Thus, the invariance models evaluated in Part II are
inconsistent with the observed rates in the pre-treatment periods.
Table 5. Maximum Absolute Difference between the Observed Annual Crime Rate in
the Treated States and the Counterfactual Estimate of the Crime Rate, 1990–200038
Before-After
Contemporaneous
DnD

Murder
1.0
1.5
0.5

Robbery
15
80
15

Assault
60
60
35

Violent Crime
85
50
25

While all three of these invariance restrictions are rejected in the pre-2006
years, the existing literature consistently applies these models, especially the
DnD and before-after invariance models. Thus, researchers are assuming that the
invariance restrictions apply when the outcomes are counterfactual even though
they are rejected in periods when the outcomes are observed. While assumptions
that are rejected in 2000 may be valid in 2010, the literature using these invariance
models does not explain why this might be the case when evaluating SYG laws.
Rather, as noted above in Part I, researchers often recognize that these strong
assumptions may have little foundation, but defend their strong assumptions as
necessary to “provide answers.” The problem is that the strong invariance
assumptions appear to be inaccurate and yield conflicting conclusions.

38. The maximum differences are rounded to the nearest 0.5 for murder and nearest 5 for all other
crimes.
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III
BOUNDED VARIATION ASSUMPTIONS
In this Part, we use bounded variation assumptions developed by Manski and
Pepper to relax the three invariance models evaluated above.39 For example,
rather than assuming the counterfactual murder rate equals the
contemporaneous rate from the untreated states, an assumption that is violated
in the pre-2006 period, we will instead assume that the counterfactual rate is
bounded between the contemporaneous rate plus and minus a constant. That is,
treated and untreated states are assumed to be similar but not identical to each
other. A bounded before-after variation assumption restricts the absolute
difference in mean treatment response between two periods to be less than some
constant. We refer to this constant as the degree of similarity and label it as “S.”
The larger the selected value of the constant, S, the weaker the assumption. These
bounded variation assumptions have identifying power because they imply that
counterfactual state-year murder rates are similar to observed rates in other
states and years.
In Part III.A, we examine the sensitivity of inferences to different identifying
restrictions without taking a stand on any particular bounded variation model or
the value of the associated degree of similarity, S. Then, in Part III.B, we apply a
specific set of bounded variation models that are consistent with the pre-2006
crime rates. In particular, we use the results in Table 5 to define the degree of
similarity. Under these bounded variation models, we find that SYG statutes
increase murder and violent crimes rates, but have uncertain effects on robbery
and assault.
A. Sensitivity of Inferences to the Bounded Variation Assumption
We begin by examining the sensitivity of inferences to different bounded
variation assumptions without taking a stand on the particular value of the degree
of similarity, S. This allows us to illustrate the sensitivity of inferences to different
assumptions.
Figure 2 traces out the effect of SYG statutes on average murder rates in the
thirteen treated states for different values of S. The traditional contemporaneous
invariance assumption, where S = 0, point-identifies the ATE, revealing that SYG
statutes increase the average murder rate by 1.65. However, ambiguity about the
ATE increases with S, and any value of S larger than two renders it impossible to
sign the ATE. For example, when S = 2, the counterfactual murder rate is
estimated to lie between [2.5, 6.5], or the counterfactual murder rate from Table
2 +/- S. The observed murder rate for the thirteen treated states is 6.2, and the
ATE is estimated to lie between [-0.3, 3.7].
Figure 2 also traces out the ATE of SYG statutes under the bounded beforeafter invariance assumption. The traditional before-after invariance assumption
(S = 0) point-identifies the ATE, revealing that the SYG statutes decrease the
39. See generally Manski & Pepper, Right-to-Carry Laws, supra note 1.
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average murder rate by -0.77. Uncertainty about the ATE increases with S, and
for values of S in excess of 1, the sign of the ATE is not identified.40 Finally,
relaxing the DnD invariance restriction even by small amounts (S ≥ 0.15) makes
it impossible to sign the ATE.
Rather than consider a single invariance assumption in isolation, it may be
sensible to combine different sets of bounded variation assumptions. For
example, one might simultaneously assume that the treated and untreated states
are similar and that treated states had similar characteristics in the 2000–2004 and
2008–2010 periods. Focusing on this joint model, some restrictions on the degree
of similarity are rejected while others lead to point-identification. For example,
it cannot be that S = 0 for both the contemporaneous and before-after bounded
variation assumptions. To see this, examine Figure 2, which shows that the point
estimate when S = 0 for the contemporaneous model differs from the point
estimate when S = 0 for the before-after model. The models point-identify the
ATE for a variety of parameter values, and identify the sign of the ATE for
others.41 The ATE is identified to be negative for any feasible values of the degree
of similarity such that S < 0.8 for before-after models, and greater than zero for
any feasible value of the parameters where S < 1.7 for contemporaneous models.
For other values of the degree of similarity, the bounds do not identify the sign
of the ATE.
Overall, this sensitivity analysis traces out ambiguity resulting from the
selection problem. We find that the sign of the ATE is identified for some
parameter values, but not others. When different bounded variation models are
simultaneously applied, the strict invariance models are ruled out, but other
models either point-identify the ATE or identify the sign of the ATE. Finally, for
some parameter values, the joint model does not identify whether SYG laws
increase or decrease murder. Clearly, as with the invariance models, the results
are sensitive to the underlying assumptions. Next, we evaluate the impact of SYG
laws under a set of particular bounded variation models that are based on the
pre-2006 data.

40. For example, when S = 2, the counterfactual murder rate is estimated to lie between [4.9, 8.9],
the observed crime rate for the thirteen treated states is 6.2, and the ATE is estimated to lie between [2.7, 1.3].
41. For example, when S = 1.2 for both models, the ATE is identified to equal 0.4, and when S = 0.1
for the bounded time variation models and 2.3 for the geographic variation models, the ATE is identified
to equal -0.7.
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Figure 2. Bounds on the ATE of Murder Rates Under Different Models and S42
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B. Estimates of the Effect of SYG Laws on Bounded Variation Assumptions
Following Manski and Pepper,43 we use the pre-treatment period to generate
data-based degree of similarity parameters, S, for each bounded variation model.
In particular, we use the estimates derived using the pre-2006 data displayed in
Table 5. These values of S ensure the bounded variation models are consistent
with the observed pre-2006 data. So, for murder, a before-after parameter S of
1.0 ensures that the bounded invariance model is consistent with the pre-2006
murder rate data. The analogous parameters for the contemporaneous model is
1.5 and for the DnD model is 0.5.
Table 6 displays the results for the three bounded-variation models discussed
in this Article, first considering the three assumptions separately and then
combining the assumptions. When the bounded variation models are applied
separately, the estimates do not generally identify the sign of the ATE. There
are, however, several notable exceptions. For violent crime rates, the ATE is
estimated to be positive under the contemporaneous and DnD bounded variation
models. Under these models, we estimate that the SYG statutes increase average
violent crime rates by at least two and by as much as 103. For murder, the ATE
is estimated to increase by at least 0.2 and at most 3.2 under the contemporaneous
model.
To narrow the bounds, we combine the three bounded variation assumptions.
Under this joint bounded variation model, the sign of the ATE is not identified
for robbery and assault. The estimated bounds imply that SYG laws might lead
42. In this Figure, LB ≡ lower bound; UB ≡ upper bound; C ≡ contemporaneous restriction; and BA
≡ before-after restriction.
43. See generally Manski & Pepper, Right-to-Carry Laws, supra note 1.

BOOK PROOF - MILLER PEPPER (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 3 2020]

8/5/2020 4:23 PM

ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF FIREARMS REGULATIONS

229

the robbery rate to fall by as much as -6 or increase by as much as 11. For the
assault rate, the data and models imply that effect of SYG laws lies between -4
and 33. Without stronger assumptions, we cannot determine whether SYG laws
increase or decrease the expected rates of robbery or assault.
However, under this joint bounded variation model, we estimate that SYG
laws increase violent crime and murder. In particular, SYG are estimated to
increase the expected murder rate by 0.2, and the violent crime rate by between
3 and 50. This implies that SYG laws increase the murder rate by 3 percent (from
6.0 to 6.2) and the violent crime rate by at least 1 percent and as much as 13
percent. Thus, under this weak bounded variation model, SYG laws are
estimated to have a modest positive effect on the average murder and violent
crime rates. Cheng and Hoekstra, who use a DnD invariance assumption, draw
similar conclusions.44 In particular, they find SYG laws do not have a statistically
significant effect on burglary, robbery, and aggravated assault, but do have a
positive effect of 8% on murder.45
Table 6. Estimated Treatment Effect Under Different Bounded Variation Models
Before-After
Contemporaneous
DnD
DnD +
Contemporaneous
DnD +
Before-After
All Three Models

Murder
[-1.8, 0.2]
[0.2, 3.2]
[-0.6, 0.4]

Robbery
[-19. 11]
[-94, 67]
[-6, 24]

Assault
[-87, 33]
[-4, 116]
[-17, 53]

Violent Crime
[-120, 50]
[ 3, 103]
[2, 52]

[0.2, 0.4]

[-6, 24]

[-4, 53]

[3, 52]

[-0.6, 0.2]

[-6, 11]

[-17, 33]

[2, 50]

[0.2, 0.2]

[-6, 11]

[-4, 33]

[3, 50]

IV
CONCLUSION
Providing credible estimates of the impact of gun laws on crime has proven
to be a difficult undertaking. Despite a large empirical literature, research has
failed to reach consensus about the impact of different gun laws on crime.46
Empirical results vary with the data and are highly sensitive to minor variation in
the model assumptions.
In this Article, we make transparent how assumptions shape inference,
focusing on the impact of SYG laws on crime rates. These assumptions can affect
the credibility of studies claiming an impact on violence relating to SYG laws.
After illustrating how the empirical findings are sensitive to commonly used
invariance assumptions, we then apply the recent methods developed by Manski
and Pepper to assess what can be inferred under relatively weak assumptions
restricting variation in treatment response across geography and time. These
partial identification models highlight the inherent tradeoff between the strength
and credibility of assumptions and findings. Strong invariance assumptions lead
44. See generally Cheng & Hoekstra, supra note 2.
45. Id. at 839.
46. See supra note 1.
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to definitive findings that may lack credibility. Weaker bounded variation
assumptions can lead to uncertain but credible findings.
By assessing the effect of SYG laws using the bounded variation
assumptions, we illustrate the sensitivity of inferences to underlying
assumptions. Under the weakest assumptions, the bounds are wide and cannot
reveal whether SYG laws increase or decrease violent crimes. But under our
preferred joint bounded invariance model, we find evidence that SYG laws have
uncertain effects on assault and robbery but lead to a modest increase in violent
crime and murder.

